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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

DEBBIE KROMMENHOCK and STEPHEN  
HADLEY, on behalf of themselves, all others  
similarly situated, and the general public,

Plaintiffs,

v.

POST FOODS, LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 3:16-cv-04958-WHO

**PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR FINAL  
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION  
SETTLEMENT**

Judge: Hon. William H. Orrick  
Hearing Date: June 23, 2021, 2:00 p.m.  
Location: Courtroom 2

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1 **NOTICE OF MOTION**

2 TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE  
3 NOTICE THAT, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) and the Northern District of California’s Procedural  
4 Guidelines for Class Action Settlements (“Settlement Guidelines”), on June 23, 2021, at 2:00 p.m., Plaintiffs  
5 will move the Court, the Honorable William H. Orrick presiding, for an Order (1) finally certifying the  
6 Settlement Class; (2) finally approving the Settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate to the Class; (3)  
7 directing the parties to undertake the obligations set forth in the Settlement Agreement that arise out of the  
8 Court’s final approval; (4) entering Judgment; and (5) maintaining jurisdiction over this matter for purpose  
9 of enforcing the Judgment.

10 The Motion is based on this Notice of Motion; the below Memorandum; the concurrently-filed  
11 declarations of Jack Fitzgerald (“Fitzgerald Decl.”) and Brandon Schwartz (“Schwartz Decl.”), and all  
12 exhibits thereto; the parties’ January 15, 2021 Settlement Agreement (“SA”);<sup>1</sup> all prior pleadings and  
13 proceedings; and any additional evidence and argument submitted in support of the Motion.

14 **ISSUES TO BE DECIDED**

15 Whether the Court should finally certify the Settlement Class, grant the proposed Settlement final  
16 approval, direct the parties to undertake the obligations set forth in the Settlement Agreement, enter  
17 Judgment, and maintain jurisdiction over the matter for purpose of enforcing the Judgment.

18 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES**

19 **I. INTRODUCTION**

20 On February 24, 2021, the Court preliminarily approved a nationwide class action settlement  
21 between Plaintiffs Debbie Krommenhock and Stephen Hadley, and Defendant Post Foods, LLC. *See*  
22 *Krommenhock v. Post Foods, LLC*, 2021 WL 750823, at \*1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2021) (Finding the  
23 “proposed Settlement Agreement appears to be fair, reasonable, adequate,” “is the result of serious,  
24 informed, non-collusive, arms-length negotiations, involving experienced counsel familiar with the legal  
25 and factual issues of this case,” and “appears to meet all applicable requirements of law.”). The Settlement  
26 resolves allegations that Defendant violated California’s Unfair Competition Law, False Advertising Law,  
27

28 <sup>1</sup> Dkt. No. 286-1, Ex. 1 to Declaration of Jack Fitzgerald in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (“PA Fitzgerald Decl.”)



1 Consumers Legal Remedies Act, and breached warranties by misleadingly and unlawfully marketing high-  
2 sugar cereals with health and wellness claims. *See* Dkt. No. 273, Third Am. Compl. (“TAC”), ¶ 2.

3 Notice has now been provided to the Class in accordance with the approved Notice Plan. This  
4 included (1) direct email notice to more than 69,000 likely Class Members for whom the Class Administrator,  
5 P&N, was provided emails by Post, and follow-up emails for recipients who had not filed a claim, and for  
6 any Class Members who had started but not completed a claim (for a total of 161,610 successful email  
7 deliveries); (2) a media notice plan resulting in 336,956,657 digital impressions (almost 7 million more than  
8 the Court-approved Notice Plan anticipated); (3) publication notice in *People Magazine* and a press release  
9 through PR Newswire’s US1 and National Hispanic Newswire, picked up by 140 media outlets, reaching a  
10 total potential audience of 58,000,000; and (4) notices with third-party websites TopClassActions.com and  
11 ClassAction.org, which drove 230,880 class members to the Settlement Website. *See* Schwartz Decl. ¶¶ 6-  
12 13 & Exs. B-E. As a result, the Notice Plan “delivered a 72.14% reach with an average frequency of 2.12,”  
13 for “a total reach *exceeding* the originally estimated 70% reach.” *Id.* ¶ 27. The Settlement Website and toll-  
14 free hotline (IVR) that P&N set up also received significant use. *See id.* ¶¶ 15, 20 (As of June 9, 2021, more  
15 than 555,000 unique users have made more than 2.8 million views of the Settlement Website, and hundreds  
16 of calls have been made to the IVR).

17 The Class’s response to the Settlement has been overwhelmingly positive. While 335,816 Class  
18 Members made valid claims, only two opted out, and none have objected. *Id.* ¶¶ 21-25.<sup>2</sup> If the Court awards  
19 the full amount of attorneys’ fees, costs, service awards, and Class Administrator fees requested, claimants  
20 will receive between approximately \$3.05 and \$73.25, depending on their quintile, *see id.* ¶ 23 & Table 3,  
21

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22  
23 <sup>2</sup> P&N received a letter titled “Notice of Objection,” but it does not comply with the procedural requirements  
24 for objecting, and—more importantly—does not lodge any actual objection to the Settlement. Instead, the  
25 author asks to “be compensated by greater means than the approved settlement thus far,” or for an “additional  
26 settlement” for “medical bills” he incurred when “forced to consume [the class products] in order to survive”  
27 while in the hospital battling serious disease. While the story is sympathetic, nothing in the letter actually  
28 addresses, much less calls into question the fairness, reasonability, or adequacy of Class Members releasing  
their *economic* claims for *false advertising* (not personal injury) in the Settlement. *Compare Edenborough v.*  
*ADT, LLC*, 2019 WL 4164731, at \*3 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2019) (Construing “letter attached to a notice of  
claim form . . . as an objection,” but finding the “concern [fell] outside of scope of the settlement.”). Although  
the letter is not a proper or valid objection, in the interest of candor and abundance of caution, Plaintiffs  
asked P&N to attach it for the Court’s review. *See* Schwartz Decl. Ex. F.

1 with an average refund of approximately \$25.28, *see* Fitzgerald Decl. ¶ 2. This exceeds the parties’ \$14.25  
2 estimate. *See* Dkt. No. 286, PA Fitzgerald Decl. ¶¶ 65-66.

3 As reflected by the high number of claims, few exclusions, and lack of objections, this is a fair,  
4 reasonable, and adequate result for the Class, while eliminating inherent risk after more than four years of  
5 hotly-contested litigation, and less than five months away from trial.<sup>3</sup> Because the settlement provides an  
6 excellent result for the Class and eliminates the risk and expense of continued litigation and lengthy appeals,  
7 Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court grant the Settlement final approval and enter Judgment.

## 8 II. LEGAL STANDARD

9 “Judicial policy favors settlement in class actions and other forms of complex litigation where  
10 substantial resources can be conserved by avoiding the time, cost, and rigors of formal litigation.” *Espinosa*  
11 *v. Cal. Coll. of San Diego, Inc.*, 2018 WL 1705955, at \*5 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2018) (citing *In re Wash. Pub.*  
12 *Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig.*, 720 F. Supp. 1379, 1387 (D. Ariz. 1989)). A class action settlement must be  
13 approved by the Court before it can become effective. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). The process for court  
14 approval of class action settlements is comprised of three steps: (1) preliminary approval, (2) dissemination  
15 of notice to the class which provides class members the opportunity to object or opt out and, (3) a final  
16 approval hearing, at which the court decides whether the proposed settlement should be approved as fair,  
17 adequate, and reasonable to the class and whether plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees, expense  
18 reimbursement and service awards should be approved. *See* Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) §  
19 21.632-35; *see also In re: Cathode Ray Tube (Crt) Antitrust Litig.*, 2016 WL 721680, at \*16 (N.D. Cal. Jan.  
20 28, 2016). The first two steps are complete; Plaintiffs now seek an Order finally approving the Settlement.

21 “To determine whether a settlement agreement meets these standards, a district court must consider  
22 a number of factors,” including: (1) the strength of the plaintiffs case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and  
23 likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (4) the  
24 amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; (6) the

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25  
26 <sup>3</sup> The full procedural, litigation, and settlement history was detailed in Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary  
27 Approval. *See* Dkt. No. 285 at 2-5 [“PA Mot.”]. The Court should finally certify the Settlement Class for  
28 the same reasons set forth in that motion. *See Cancilla v. Ecolab, Inc.*, 2016 WL 54113, at \*2 (N.D. Cal.  
Jan. 5, 2016) (“[C]onclusion[]” at preliminary approval stage that settlement class should be certified  
“hold[s] at this final stage.”).

1 experience and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental participant; and (8) the reaction of the  
 2 class members to the proposed settlement. *Knapp v. Art.com, Inc.*, 283 F. Supp. 3d 823, 830 (N.D. Cal. 2017)  
 3 (Orrick, J.) (citing *Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec.*, 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004); *In re Bluetooth*  
 4 *Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) [*“Bluetooth”*]). The Court need not weigh all  
 5 of the factors, “and different factors may predominate in different factual contexts.” *Rieckborn v. Velti PLC*,  
 6 2015 WL 468329, at \*3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2015) (Orrick, J.) (quoting *Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co.*, 8  
 7 F.3d 1370, 1376 (9th Cir. 1993)). Further:

8           While considering all these interests, “the court’s intrusion upon what is otherwise a  
 9 private consensual agreement negotiated between the parties to a lawsuit must be  
 10 limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not  
 11 the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties,  
 and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all  
 concerned.”

12 *Id.*, at \*4 (quoting *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982)).

13 **III. THE SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE FINALLY APPROVED AS FAIR, REASONABLE, AND**  
 14 **ADEQUATE FOR THE CLASS**

15 A consideration of the *Churchill* factors demonstrates the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate,  
 16 thus warranting final approval.

17 **A. The Strength of the Case, and the Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of**  
 18 **Further Litigation**

19 “In determining whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate” the Court first “balance[s]  
 20 the risks of continued litigation, including the strengths and weaknesses of plaintiff’s case, against the  
 21 benefits afforded to class members, including the immediacy and certainty of recovery.” *Knapp*, 283 F. Supp.  
 22 3d at 831-32. (citing *Larsen v. Trader Joe’s Co.*, 2014 WL 3404531, at \*4 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2014); *LaGarde*  
 23 *v. Support.com, Inc.*, 2013 WL 1283325, at \*4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013)). Given “all the normal perils of  
 24 litigation as well as the additional uncertainties inherent in complex class actions,” see *In re Beef Indus.*  
 25 *Antitrust Litig.*, 607 F.2d 167, 179-80 (5th Cir. 1979), “unless [a proposed] settlement is clearly inadequate,”  
 26 a court should normally find “its acceptance and approval are preferable to lengthy and expensive litigation  
 27 with uncertain results.” *Knapp*, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 832 (citing *Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV,*  
 28 *Inc.*, 221 F.R.D. 523, 526 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also *Rojas v. Zaninovich,*

1 2015 WL 3657172, at \*12 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2015) (Courts consider, among other things, the “normal perils  
2 of litigation, including the merits of the affirmative defenses asserted by Defendant, the difficulties of  
3 complex litigation, [and] the lengthy process of establishing specific damages.”).

4 Here, “[w]hile [ ] [P]laintiffs assert that they believe their claims are strong, they acknowledge,” as  
5 detailed in their motion for preliminary approval, “that they would face significant risks should the case  
6 proceed through litigation.” *See Larsen*, 2014 WL 3404531, at \*4 (record citation omitted); *compare* PA  
7 Mot. at 18-19. Post “vigorously denied liability and challenged all of [ ] [P]laintiffs’ claims,” *see id.*, and  
8 when tested in focus groups, Plaintiffs found some of Post’s defenses “were reasonably compelling to  
9 respondents,” PA Mot. at 18 (citing PA Fitzgerald Decl. ¶ 32). The Court also cautioned Plaintiffs this would  
10 be “a complex case to prove [at trial] given its breadth and scope,” requiring “pro[of] that reasonable  
11 consumers would be misled by each particular label used for each Product during the class period,” making  
12 continued litigation particularly risky and expensive. *See Krommenhock v. Post Foods, LLC*, 334 F.R.D. 552,  
13 566 (N.D. Cal. 2020); *see also Krommenhock v. Post Foods, LLC*, 2020 WL 2322993, at \*3 (N.D. Cal. May  
14 11, 2020) (noting “that the expert work and trial in this case will be extensive and complex” (record citation  
15 omitted)); *compare* PA Mot. at 18.

16 Even if Plaintiffs successfully proved Post’s liability, “[t]here was also risk in Plaintiffs’ damages  
17 case,” with “the vast majority of Plaintiffs’ potential damages [ ] tied up in a single product, Honey Bunches  
18 of Oats . . . [a]nd across the products, a single claim—the Whole Grains Council Stamp—account[ing] for  
19 more than 60% of damages; yet Post argued vehemently that Mr. Gaskin’s measurement of this claim’s price  
20 premium was fatally flawed.” PA Mot. at 18 (citing PA Fitzgerald Decl. ¶¶ 27-28 & n.6). If Plaintiffs lost at  
21 trial on these issues, “the amount of damages possibly recoverable by the class would shrink dramatically,”  
22 to just \$3.7 million. *See* PA Fitzgerald Decl. ¶ 29; *compare Rieckborn*, 2015 WL 468329, at \*5 (finding  
23 similar fact favored granting final approval). “[A]lthough [Plaintiffs’] claims were quite strong,” there were  
24 clear factual challenges facing Plaintiffs at trial, including “challenges [with] [ ] damages,” so the Court  
25 should find the first two *Churchill* factors weigh in favor of granting final approval. *See Nguyen v. Radiant*  
26 *Pharms. Corp.*, 2014 WL 1802293, at \*2-3 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2014).

27 Here, the Settlement “achieves a definite and certain result for the benefit of the Settlement Classes,”  
28 making it “preferable to continuing litigation in which the Settlement Class would necessarily confront

1 substantial risk, uncertainty, delay, and cost.” See *Donald v. Xanitos, Inc.*, 2017 WL 1508675, at \*2 (N.D.  
2 Cal. Apr. 27, 2017) (Orrick, J.). Thus, in light of “the significant risks that lie ahead . . . [at] trial, it is  
3 reasonable for the parties at this stage to agree that the actual recovery realized and risks avoided here  
4 outweigh the opportunity to pursue potentially more favorable results.” See *Larsen*, 2014 WL 3404531, at  
5 \*4. Because “[t]he settlement avoids the risks that the [P]laintiffs would not succeed in demonstrating that  
6 [Post] failed to comply with state consumer protection laws,” “this factor weighs in favor of final approval  
7 of the settlement.” See *id.*; see also *Rieckborn*, 2015 WL 468329, at \*4-5 (the “first two [*Churchill*] factors  
8 weigh in favor of approval” where “Plaintiffs contend that their claims have significant merit but  
9 acknowledge a number of risks and uncertainties should they proceed,” including that “Defendants have  
10 adamantly denied liability and have asserted from the outset that they possess absolute defenses to all of  
11 plaintiffs’ claims,” and that “[p]roving damages would also entail substantial uncertainty . . . depend[ing] .  
12 . . on which, if any, of the four alleged partial corrective disclosures plaintiffs are ultimately able to rely,”  
13 making “further litigation . . . likely to be costly and time-intensive, with no guarantee of a more beneficial  
14 outcome for class members as a result”).

#### 15 **B. The Amount of Settlement**

16 “This factor examines the benefits to class members.” *Larsen*, 2014 WL 3404531, at \*4 (citing  
17 *Churchill Village*, 361 F.3d at 574). “Assessing the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the amount  
18 offered in settlement is not a matter of applying a ‘particular formula.’” *Knapp*, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 832  
19 (citing *Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp.*, 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir. 2009)). Instead, “[w]hen considering the  
20 fairness and adequacy of the amount offered in settlement, ‘it is the complete package taken as a whole,  
21 rather than the individual component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness.’” *Bellinghausen v.*  
22 *Tractor Supply Co.*, 306 F.R.D. 245, 256 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting *Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop.*, 221  
23 F.R.D. at 527). Further, “it is well-settled law that a proposed settlement may be acceptable even though it  
24 amounts to only a fraction of the potential recovery that might be available to the class members at trial.”  
25 *Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop.*, 221 F.R.D. at 527; cf. *City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.*, 495 F.2d 448, 455  
26 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974) (“[T]here is no reason, at least in theory, why a satisfactory settlement could not amount  
27 to a hundredth or even a thousandth part of a single percent of the potential recovery.”). Finally, that a  
28 “Settlement Agreement also provides for injunctive relief” is an important consideration in evaluating its

1 benefit, since “class members that choose to continue doing business with [the defendant] will benefit from  
2 this aspect as well.” *See Knapp*, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 833.

3 Here, the Settlement’s \$15,000,000 common fund for a nationwide Class of approximately 20.9  
4 million Members, is fair, reasonable, and adequate, especially in light if the robust injunctive relief obtained  
5 for the Class’s benefit—Post’s agreement to remove, if not already removed, and to refrain from using for  
6 some time, a variety of health and wellness claims on Class Products containing more than 10% of calories  
7 from added sugar. SA ¶¶ 5.1-5.11; *see also* PA Mot. at 21-23 & n.11. Assuming the Court approves or awards  
8 the full amount of notice and administration costs, attorneys’ fees and costs, and service awards requested,  
9 Class Member claimants will divide the remaining approximately \$8.47 million for an average refund of  
10 approximately \$25.28 per claimant. *See* Fitzgerald Decl. ¶ 2.<sup>4</sup> This relates favorably to the average payout  
11 of \$14.25 the parties estimated in moving for preliminary approval. *See* PA Mot. at 6 (citing PA Fitzgerald  
12 Decl. ¶ 66); *compare De Leon v. Ricoh USA, Inc.*, 2020 WL 1531331, at \*9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2020)  
13 (granting final approval where “[i]n granting preliminary approval the Court concluded that the estimated  
14 payout to class members was fair in relation to the risks of continued litigation . . . and there [wa]s nothing  
15 in the final approval materials that change[d] the Court’s analysis on that score”).

16 This payout represents for the claimants a significant recovery in relation to potential trial damages,  
17 where Plaintiffs would have to show “the difference between the prices customers paid and the value of the  
18 [products] they bought—in other words, the ‘price premium’ attributable to [Defendant’s advertising  
19 claims].” *See Brazil v. Dole Packaged Foods, LLC*, 660 F. App’x 531, 534 (9th Cir. 2016). Here, the price  
20 premiums Plaintiffs’ experts calculated range from 0.75% (Honeycomb’s “Nutritious” claim),<sup>5</sup> to 29.7%  
21 (Alpha Bits Whole Grains Council Stamp), with sales volumes ranging widely. *See* Dkt. No. 240-9, Suppl.  
22 Weir Decl., at ECF Header pp. 10-12 (unredacted version filed under seal). With average retail prices  
23 between \$2.58 and \$4.45, if Plaintiffs were successful at trial, damages under a price premium theory could  
24 be as low as \$0.02 per purchase of Honeycomb, and at most—assuming the jury awarded the *aggregate* of  
25 all price premium damages for each product—as high as \$2.00 per purchase for Bran Flakes, with an average

26 \_\_\_\_\_  
27 <sup>4</sup> Depending on their quintile, nearly all claimants (i.e., other than those few who submitted receipts for  
28 purchases that exceed the highest quintile) will receive the following refunds: Quintile 1: \$3.05; Quintile 2:  
\$8.47; Quintile 3: \$15.24; Quintile 4: \$26.06; and Quintile 5: \$73.25. *See* Schwartz Decl. ¶ 23 & Table 3.

<sup>5</sup> This is the lowest non-zero measured price premium; one Great Grains claim showed no premium.



1 aggregate damages per product of \$0.80 per purchase. *See* Fitzgerald Decl. ¶ 3. The Settlement provides  
 2 claimants with an average cash award of \$25.28 (equivalent to the average damages amount for 31.6 units),  
 3 and is thus an excellent result for the Class, particularly given the risks and expenses associated with trial  
 4 and appeals, *see supra* at 7-9.<sup>6</sup>

5 Because the Settlement amount is a fair, reasonable, and adequate result for the Class, this factor  
 6 weighs in favor of approval. *See Broomfield v. Craft Brew Alliance, Inc.*, 2020 WL 1972505, at \*9 (N.D.  
 7 Cal. Feb. 5, 2020) (approving settlement where Class Members would receive between \$1.25 to \$2.75 per  
 8 unit purchased, for a maximum of \$10 without proof of purchase); *Fitzhenry-Russell v. Coca-Cola Co.*, 2019  
 9 WL 11557486, at \*6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2019) (approving settlement fund of \$2,450,000 that would pay  
 10 restitution of \$0.80 per unit, up to \$10.40 (thirteen units) without proof of purchase); *Hendricks v. Starkist*  
 11 *Co.*, 2016 WL 5462423, at \*5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2016) (approving settlement in which class members  
 12 would receive \$1.97 cash or \$4.43 voucher per claim, and noting that the “settlement amount, while  
 13 constituting only a single-digit percentage of the maximum potential exposure, is reasonable given the stage  
 14 of the proceedings and the defenses asserted”); *see also Hilsley v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc.*, 2020 WL  
 15 520616, at \*6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2020) (finding \$1.00 recovery per bottled purchased to be “an excellent  
 16 result” considering the fraction of purchase price recoverable at trial); *Beck-Ellman v. Kaz USA, Inc.*, 2013  
 17 WL 10102326, at \*6 (S.D. Cal. June 11, 2013) (Factor weighed in favor of approval where “Class members

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18  
 19 <sup>6</sup> As detailed in Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Approval Motion, the Settlement is also fair, reasonable, and adequate  
 20 when considered on an absolute basis. Depending on what the jury determines is false (if anything), trial  
 21 damages could be as little as zero dollars (for instance if the jury *only* found Great Grains “Less Processed”  
 22 false and misleading), or range into the hundreds of thousands if a small subset of challenged claims are  
 23 found to be false, up to potentially \$57.9 million if all challenged claims were false, and the jury agreed with  
 24 Plaintiffs’ experts on the price premiums associated with each claim. *See* Suppl. Weir Decl. at 10 (ECF  
 25 Header p. 12). At worst, the nationwide Settlement amount is approximately 25.9% of the damages that could  
 26 be obtained at trial on behalf of the California Class, and 3.1% of the proportional estimated nationwide  
 27 damages of \$482.5 million. *See* PA Mot. at 21-21; PA Fitzgerald Decl. ¶ 26. This amount is a best-case  
 28 scenario for Plaintiffs. For example, discounting damages attributable to the WGC Stamp, the \$15 million  
 common fund represents 66.7% of the California litigation class’s damages, and 8% of estimated nationwide  
 damages. Discounting damages attributable to Honey Bunches of Oats, the Settlement would represent 146%  
 of the remaining \$10.3 million damages for the California Class, and 17.5% of corresponding nationwide  
 damages. Discounting *both*, the Settlement represents more than 405% of the remaining \$3.7 million in  
 damages, and 48.6% of proportionate nationwide damages. *Cf. Harvey v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC*,  
 2020 WL 1031801, at \*6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2020) (Orrick, J.) (where there are “substantial risks as to  
 [certain] claims,” it is “reasonable for Plaintiffs’ counsel to assign no or little value to these claims when  
 considering the overall full-verdict value.”).

1 may each recover up to \$20 in reimbursements, although Kaz Heating Pads sold during the class period for  
 2 around \$10 to \$20 per pad” and “[t]he settlement also include[d] substantial injunctive relief relating to  
 3 Plaintiffs’ claims, valued by economics professor Anthony Cox to be worth as much as \$10,726,000.” (record  
 4 citations omitted)).

5 **C. Extent of Discovery Completed and Stage of Proceedings**

6 “This factor evaluates whether ‘the parties have sufficient information to make an informed decision  
 7 about settlement,’” *Knapp*, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 833 (quoting *Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship*, 151 F.3d  
 8 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 1998)). “The extent of discovery completed and the state of the proceedings at the time  
 9 of settlement is a strong indicator of whether the parties have sufficient understanding of each other’s cases  
 10 to make an informed judgment about their likelihood of prevailing.” *Lane v. Brown*, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1180,  
 11 1190 (D. Or. 2016). Thus, “[a] court is more likely to approve a settlement if most of the discovery is  
 12 completed because it suggests that the parties arrived at a compromise based on a full understanding of the  
 13 legal and factual issues surrounding the case.” *Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop.*, 221 F.R.D. at 527 (internal  
 14 quotation marks and citation omitted). “For that reason, ‘[a] settlement following sufficient discovery and  
 15 genuine arms-length negotiation is *presumed fair*.’” *Lane*, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 1190 (emphasis added)  
 16 (quoting *Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop.*, 221 F.R.D. at 528).

17 A presumption of fairness applies here because the parties litigated for more than four years,  
 18 including extensive motion practice, fact and expert discovery were complete,<sup>7</sup> only trial remained, and the  
 19 Settlement was reached through three in-person arms-length negotiations with the assistance of Judges  
 20 Infante and Holderman, and Chief Magistrate Judge Spero. *See* PA Fitzgerald Decl. ¶¶ 9-24. Yet even absent  
 21 such a presumption, it is clear that “[b]y th[e] late stage of the litigation” at which the Settlement was  
 22 reached, “both sides had a strong understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of each other’s case,” such  
 23 that this factor “strongly favors approval.” *See Lane*, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 1185, 1190 (granting final approval  
 24 where “[a]fter almost four years of litigation, extensive fact and expert discovery, and prior unsuccessful  
 25 efforts to resolve the dispute, the parties engaged in lengthy settlement negotiations a few months

26 \_\_\_\_\_  
 27 <sup>7</sup> This includes *inter alia*, 19 substantive motions, review of over 59,000 pages of documents, three sets of  
 28 interrogatories, two sets of requests for admission, 21 depositions, 39 third-party subpoenas, and 12 expert  
 reports, including a classwide damages analysis that survived Post’s *Comcast* and *Daubert* challenges. *See*  
 PA Fitzgerald Decl. ¶¶ 9-16.



1 before trial and signed a Proposed Settlement Agreement”); *see also Gaudin v. Saxon Mortgage Servs., Inc.*,  
 2 2015 WL 7454183, at \*6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2015) (factor supported final approval where plaintiff  
 3 “conduct[ed] extensive discovery and investigation (before and after class certification), reviewing  
 4 approximately 25,000 pages of [Defendant’s] documents, and participating in three separate rounds of  
 5 settlement negotiations” (internal quotation marks and record citations omitted)); *Booth v. Strategic Realty*  
 6 *Tr., Inc.*, 2015 WL 6002919, at \*5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2015) (factor favored final approval where “among  
 7 other things, [plaintiffs] review[ed] more than 150,000 pages of documents produced by Defendants and  
 8 non-parties, analyz[ed], with the assistance of an expert, data produced by Defendants, prepar[ed] for and  
 9 participat[ed] in mediation, and negotiat[ed] the details of the Settlement Agreement for over two months”  
 10 (internal quotation marks and record citations omitted)).

#### 11 **D. The Experience and Views of Class Counsel**

12 “The Ninth Circuit recognizes that ‘parties represented by competent counsel are better positioned  
 13 than courts to produce a settlement that fairly reflects each party’s expected outcome in litigation.’” *Knapp*,  
 14 283 F. Supp. 3d at 833 (quoting *Rodriguez*, 563 F.3d at 967). In determining whether a settlement is fair  
 15 and reasonable, “[t]he judgment of experienced counsel regarding the settlement is [therefore] entitled to  
 16 great weight.” *White v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc.*, 2009 WL 10670553, at \*12 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2009)  
 17 (citing *M. Berenson Co. v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace, Inc.*, 671 F. Supp. 819, 822 (D. Mass 1987); *Linney*  
 18 *v. Cellular Alaska P’ship*, 1997 WL 450064, at \*5 (N.D. Cal. 1997)). As a result, “[t]he recommendations  
 19 of plaintiffs’ counsel should be given a presumption of reasonableness.” *Id.* (quoting *Boyd v. Bechtel Corp.*,  
 20 485 F. Supp. 610, 622 (N.D. Cal. 1979)).

21 Class Counsel here has considerable experience in consumer class actions, and particularly those  
 22 involving the false advertising of foods, especially as healthy. Moreover, Class Counsel has been litigating  
 23 several similar cases during the pendency of this action and has therefore been exposed to a wide variety of  
 24 information about the claims and defenses, and ultimately the potential upside and risks attendant to this  
 25 case. PA Fitzgerald Decl. ¶42. Because Class Counsel has substantial experience with complex class actions  
 26 generally, as well as an intimate understanding of the specific facts and issues present here, and strongly  
 27 endorse the Settlement, *id.* ¶¶ 40-42, this factor favors final approval. *See Larsen*, 2014 WL 3404531, at \*5  
 28 (factor favored final approval where “Plaintiffs’ counsel ha[d] successfully represented consumers both as

litigation class and settlement class counsel numerous times, including cases involving food mislabeling,” and “believe[d] approval [wa]s in the best interests of the putative settlement class.”); *Carter v. XPO Logistics, Inc.*, 2019 WL 5295125, at \*3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2019) (Orrick, J.) (“Class Counsel are experienced counsel who, after weighing all of the risk factors endorse the proposed settlement,” which favored approval).

#### E. The Presence of a Governmental Participant

“There is no governmental participant here.” *See Knapp*, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 833. Because, however, P&N “notified officials of the proposed settlement pursuant to CAFA . . . and no government entity has raised an objection,” this factor “favors settlement.” *See id.* (citing *Schuchardt v. Law Office of Rory W. Clark*, 314 F.R.D. 673, 685 (N.D. Cal. 2016); *Holman v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc.*, 2014 WL 7186207, at \*3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2014); *Garner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 2010 WL 1687832, at \*14 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2010)); *compare* Schwartz Decl. ¶ 4.

#### F. The Reactions of the Class Members

“The reaction of the [C]lass to the [S]ettlement is overwhelmingly positive,” with a robust 335,816 valid claims filed,<sup>8</sup> only 2 opt-outs, and *no objections*; this factor thus “strongly favors final approval.” *See Edwards v. Nat’l Milk Producers Fed’n*, 2017 WL 3623734, at \*2, \*8 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2017) (Factor favored approval where “307,396 class members had submitted claims online, and an additional 125 class members had submitted paper claim forms,” yet “only eight objections and one request for exclusion were received out of the millions of class members receiving notice.”), *aff’d sub nom.*, *Edwards v. Andrews*, 846 Fed. App’x 538 (9th Cir. 2021).<sup>9</sup> “A low number of opt-outs and objections in comparison to class size is

<sup>8</sup> This represents a claims rate of approximately 1.61% of the estimated 20.9 million Class Members, which is less than the 2.82% claims rate Plaintiffs predicted applying the methodology required by the Settlement Guidelines. *See* PA Fitzgerald Decl. ¶¶ 54-57. Nevertheless, as discussed below, the claims rate falls into the typical range expected in low-value consumer packaged goods class action settlements.

<sup>9</sup> Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Service Awards, and the supporting Fitzgerald Declaration and Exhibits, were posted on the Settlement Website the same day they were filed, so that Class Members had access to the motion for five weeks before the objection deadline, but no Class Member has objected to any aspect of the motion. *See* Fitzgerald Decl. ¶ 3. After Plaintiffs filed the motion, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision holding that, “under the newly enacted Rule 23(e), federal courts must scrutinize attorneys’ fees for potential collusion that shortchanges the class, even in post-class certification settlements.” *Briseno v. Henderson*, --- F.3d ----, ----, 2021 WL 2197968, at \*13 (9th Cir. June 1, 2021). Courts should do this by “apply[ing] the *Bluetooth* factors even for post-class certification settlements.” *Id.*,

1 typically a factor that supports settlement approval.” *Noll v. eBay, Inc.*, 309 F.R.D. 593, 608 (N.D. Cal.  
 2 2015) (citing *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he fact that the  
 3 overwhelming majority of the class willingly approved the offer and stayed in the class presents at least  
 4 some objective positive commentary as to its fairness”)); *see also Larsen*, 2014 WL 3404531, at \*5 (“The  
 5 participation rate and positive response of the class weigh[ed] in favor of finding that the settlement is  
 6 favorable to the class members” where “a total of 59,830 class members [ ] submitted claim forms, twenty-  
 7 three [ ] opted out, and sixteen [ ] objected”); *Zepeda v. PayPal, Inc.*, 2017 WL 1113293, at \*15 (N.D. Cal.  
 8 Mar. 24, 2017) (“The Ninth Circuit has held that the number of class members who object to a proposed  
 9 settlement is a factor to be considered.” (citing *Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods. Inc.*, 541 F.2d 832,  
 10 837 (9th Cir. 1976))).

11 “[T]he absence of a large number of objections to a proposed class action settlement raises a strong  
 12 presumption that the terms of a proposed class settlement action are favorable to the class members,” *Larsen*,  
 13 2014 WL 3404531, at \*5 (quoting *Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop.*, 221 F.R.D. at 529), and courts may thus  
 14 “appropriately infer that a class action settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable when few class members  
 15 object to it,” *id.* (quoting *Create-A-Card, Inc. v. Intuit, Inc.*, 2009 WL 3073920, at \*15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22,  
 16 2009)). “This ‘strong presumption’ of fairness arises here, because . . . [no] objections and [only two]  
 17 request[s] for exclusion were received out of the millions of class members receiving notice.” *See Edwards*,  
 18 2017 WL 3623734, at \*8; *see also* Schwartz Decl. ¶¶ 24-25; *supra* n.2.

19 The absence of any objections and extremely low opt-out rate—just 0.0006% of the 335,816 claims  
 20 filed and 0.000009% of the estimated 20.9 million class members—strongly favors final approval here,  
 21 since “[t]hese statistics indicate a favorable reaction by class members and their overall satisfaction with the  
 22 Settlement.” *See Noll*, 309 F.R.D. at 608 (factor favored approval where “of over 1,188,000 potential Class  
 23 Members, only 97 [ ] opted out” and “only three objections were filed (including one that was not timely),  
 24 translating into an objection rate of 0.00025%” (citing *Custom LED LLC v. eBay, Inc.*, 2013 WL 6114379,  
 25 at \*9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2013) (granting final approval and characterizing 0.04% exclusion rate, with one  
 26

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
 28 at \*5. Although Plaintiffs obtained certification of a litigation class, their Preliminary Approval motion  
 demonstrated why the *Bluetooth* factors—which are entirely non-existent here—do not indicate collusion.  
*See* Dkt. No. 285, Mot. at 16-17. The analysis applies equally to their instant fee motion. *See* Dkt. No. 297.

1 objection, as “overwhelmingly positive” reaction); *Chun–Hoon v. McKee Foods Corp.*, 716 F. Supp. 2d  
 2 848, 852 (N.D. Cal.2010) (4.86% opt-out rate strongly supported approval)); *see also Knapp*, 283 F. Supp.  
 3 3d at 833 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (factor favored final approval where “[t]he settlement administrator received  
 4 valid opt-outs from 452 class members, which amount[ed] to less than .03 percent of the class members  
 5 who received notice,” making “[i]t [ ] apparent that the ‘overwhelming majority of the class’ had nothing to  
 6 say about the fairness of the settlement.” (quotation omitted)).<sup>10</sup>

7 While the low opt-out and nonexistent objection rates indicate the majority of the Class approved of  
 8 the Settlement and chose to remain in the Settlement Class, the 1.61% claims rate is also “on par with other  
 9 consumer cases, and does not otherwise weigh against approval.” *See Schneider v. Chipotle Mexican Grill,*  
 10 *Inc.*, 2020 WL 6484833, at \*9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2020) (approving settlement with 0.83% claims rate)  
 11 (citing *Broomfield*, 2020 WL 1972505, at \*7 (approving settlement with response rate of “about two  
 12 percent”)). Because “consumer class actions tend to result in claims rates in the low single digits,” *Rael v.*  
 13 *Children’s Place, Inc.*, 2020 WL 434482, at \*9 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2020), the Court should find that the  
 14 1.61% claims rate supports final approval here, particularly in light of the low opt-out rate and lack of  
 15 objections. *See Touhey v. United States*, 2011 WL 3179036, at \*7-8 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2011) (approving  
 16 settlement where only 38 claims were filed, which was “approximately 2%” claims rate, based in part on  
 17 “the lack of objections”); *Perez v. Asurion Corp.*, 501 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1377-78 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (approving  
 18 settlement with claims rate of about 1.2%); *see also* PA Fitzgerald Decl. Ex. 9 (discussing *Bayol v. Health-*  
 19

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20  
 21 <sup>10</sup> *See also Johnson v. Quantum Learning Network, Inc.*, 2017 WL 747462, at \*2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2017)  
 22 (“The lack of objections and the low rate of opt-outs (less than 1%) are ‘indicia of the approval of the class.’”  
 23 (citation omitted)); *Zepeda*, 2017 WL 1113293, at \*15 (factor favored approval where “notice was served on  
 24 approximately 100 million PayPal customers, including approximately 10.5 million Claims Class members”  
 25 and “[i]n response, close to 400,000 claims . . . [were] filed,” “[y]et, only eleven class members filed  
 26 objections and 75 [ ] opted out” (citations omitted)); *Stonehocker v. Kindred Healthcare Operating LLC*,  
 27 2021 WL 1643226, at \*5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2021) (finding “[t]he reaction of the class  
 28 was overwhelmingly positive” where “the Court received only three opt-outs and no objections”); *Thomas*  
*v. MagnaChip Semiconductor Corp.*, 2018 WL 2234598, at \*2-3 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2018) (finding  
 “[t]he reaction of the class was overwhelmingly positive” where “[n]o class members objected, and only one  
 class member submitted a request for exclusion”); *Jarrell v. Amerigas Propane, Inc.*, 2018 WL 1640055, at  
 \*2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2018) (finding “[t]he reaction of the class was overwhelmingly positive” where “[n]o  
 objections were received, and only three class members, or approximately 1% of the class, opted out.” (record  
 citation omitted)).

1 *Ade LLC*, No. 18-cv-1462 (N.D. Cal.) (approving settlement with 1.09% claim rate); *Broomfield v. Craft*  
 2 *Brew Alliance, Inc.*, No. 17-cv-1027 (N.D. Cal.) (approving settlement with 1.83% claim rate)).

3 Although Plaintiffs initially estimated a claims rate of 2.82% by averaging claim rates in similar  
 4 food and beverage false advertising class actions, PA Fitzgerald Decl. Exs. 9-22, the actual claim rate of  
 5 1.61% is not significantly below this estimate and, in any event, “this ratio is not dispositive and should not  
 6 be given great significance because many factors affect response rates,” *Bostick v. Herbalife Int’l of Am.,*  
 7 *Inc.*, 2015 WL 12731932, at \*27 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2015) (approving settlement with “response rate of  
 8 less than 1%” (citation and internal quotations omitted)). Further, even where “the parties’ estimated [a]  
 9 claims rate at the preliminary approval stage of between five and ten percent,” but the actual claims rate was  
 10 “well below th[at] estimate[,]” final approval is appropriate where, “for those class members who did file  
 11 claims, the monetary relief available appears reasonable.” *see Bayat v. Bank of the W.*, 2015 WL 1744342,  
 12 at \*5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2015).

### 13 **G. The Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status Through Trial**

14 “This factor, which concerns the risk of maintaining class certification, also favors settlement.”  
 15 *Larsen*, 2014 WL 3404531, at \*4. While “[t]he Court already granted class certification,” “and conditionally  
 16 certified a class for settlement purposes only in granting preliminary approval,” “[u]nder Federal Rule of  
 17 Civil Procedure 23(c)(1)(C), an ‘order that grants . . . class certification may be altered or amended before  
 18 the final judgment.’” *See Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc.*, 2017 WL 4685536, at \*4 (C.D. Cal.  
 19 May 8, 2017) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C)). Thus, “[a]lthough Plaintiffs believe they would be  
 20 successful in maintaining class action status through trial and appeal,” because Post “vigorously opposed  
 21 class certification, previously filed a [23(f) petition to appeal certification], and indicated its intention to  
 22 challenge certification again,” “the risk that Defendant may prove successful in attacking class certification,  
 23 . . . favors final approval of the Settlement Agreement.” *See id.*; *see also Edwards*, 2017 WL 3623734, at \*7  
 24 (“Although plaintiffs are confident the class would remain certified through trial, the risk ‘was not so minimal  
 25 that this factor could not weigh in favor of the settlement.’” (quotation and citation omitted)).

### 26 **CONCLUSION**

27 The Court should grant the Settlement final approval and enter Judgment.

1 Dated: June 9, 2021

Respectfully Submitted,

2 /s/ Jack Fitzgerald

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4 **JACK FITZGERALD, PC**

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***Class Counsel***

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

DEBBIE KROMMENHOCK and STEPHEN  
HADLEY, on behalf of themselves, all others  
similarly situated, and the general public,

Plaintiffs,

v.

POST FOODS, LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 3:16-cv-04958-WHO

**DECLARATION OF JACK  
FITZGERALD IN SUPPORT OF  
MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF  
CLASS SETTLEMENT**

Judge: Hon. William H. Orrick  
Hearing Date: June 23, 2021, 2:00 p.m.  
Location: Courtroom 2

1 I, Jack Fitzgerald, declare:

2 1. I am a member in good standing of the State Bars of California and New York; and of the  
3 United States District Courts for the Northern, Eastern, Central, and Southern Districts of California, the  
4 Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, and the Western District of Wisconsin; and of the United States  
5 Court of Appeals for the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal. I make this Declaration based  
6 on my own personal knowledge in support of Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval.

7 2. Based on the IRI data in this case, the average retail price for the Class Products ranged from  
8 \$2.58 to \$4.45 and, based on the price premia derived from Plaintiffs' damages analyses, damages for those  
9 products ranged from \$0.02 per Honeycomb purchase, to \$2.00 per Bran Flakes purchase, with an average  
10 damages amount of \$0.80 per purchase. Given the 335,816 valid claims that Class Members made, if the  
11 Court awards the full amount of fees, costs, service awards, and Class Administrator fees requested,  
12 claimants will receive an average refund of approximately \$25.28 as follows.

<b>Settlement Fund</b>	<b>\$15,000,000</b>
Notice & Administration – Already Incurred	(\$312,702)
Notice & Administration – Estimated Additional Costs	(\$187,298 - \$207,298)
Attorneys' Fees	(\$5,000,000)
Expenses	(\$986,400)
Service Awards	(\$15,000)
Remainder	\$8,478,600 - \$8,498,600
Claims	335,816
<b>Remainder ÷ Claims</b>	<b>\$25.25 - \$25.31 (avg. = \$25.28)</b>

21 3. Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Service Awards ("Fee Motion"), and my  
22 supporting Declaration (Dkt. Nos. 297-98), were posted to the Settlement Website on the same day they  
23 were filed, April 14, 2021. Thus, Class Members had full access to the motion for five weeks before the  
24 objection deadline, but no Class Member has objected to any aspect of the motion.

25 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge  
26 and belief. Executed this 9th day of June 2021, in San Diego, California.

27 /s/ Jack Fitzgerald  
28 Jack Fitzgerald



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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

DEBBIE KROMMENHOCK and STEPHEN  
HADLEY, on behalf of themselves, all others  
similarly situated, and the general public,

Plaintiffs,

v.

POST FOODS, LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 3:16-cv-04958-WHO

**[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING  
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR FINAL  
APPROVAL OF CLASS SETTLEMENT AND  
FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL**

1 The Court having held a Final Approval Hearing on June 23, 2021, notice of the Final Approval  
2 Hearing having been duly given in accordance with this Court’s Order Granting Preliminary Approval of the  
3 Class Action Settlement, and having considered all matters submitted to it at the Final Approval Hearing and  
4 otherwise, and good cause appearing therefore,

5 **THE COURT HEREBY FINDS AND ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:**

6 1. Incorporation of Other Documents. The Settlement Agreement dated January 15, 2021,  
7 including its exhibits, and the definitions of words and terms contained therein are incorporated by reference  
8 in this Order. The terms of this Court’s Preliminary Approval Order are also incorporated by reference in  
9 this Order.

10 2. Jurisdiction. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this Action and over the  
11 Parties, including all members of the following Settlement Class certified for settlement purposes in this  
12 Court’s Preliminary Approval Order: All persons in the United States who, between August 29, 2012 and  
13 November 2, 2020 (the “Class Period”), purchased in the United States, for household use and not for resale  
14 or distribution, any of the Class Products identified in Appendix 1 to the Settlement Agreement. Excluded  
15 from the Settlement Class are all persons who validly excluded themselves from the Settlement Class  
16 according to the terms of this Court’s Preliminary Approval Order.

17 3. Class Certification. For purposes of settlement only, the Settlement Class, as defined in the  
18 Settlement Agreement and above, meets the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a) and  
19 23(b). Accordingly, for purposes of settlement, the Court finally certifies the Settlement Class.

20 4. Adequate Representation. The Class Representatives and Class Counsel have adequately  
21 represented the Settlement Class in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2)(A).

22 5. Arms-Length Negotiations. The Settlement Agreement is the product of arms-length  
23 settlement negotiations between the Plaintiffs and Class Counsel, on the one hand, and Defendant and its  
24 counsel, on the other, in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2)(B).

25 6. Class Notice. The Class Notice and claims submission procedures set forth in Sections 4 and  
26 6 of the Settlement Agreement and the Notice Plan filed on January 18, 2021 fully satisfy Rule 23 of the  
27 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the requirements of due process, were the best notice practicable under  
28 the circumstances, provided individual notice to all Settlement Class Members who could be identified

1 through reasonable effort, and support the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the Settlement Classes as  
2 contemplated in the Settlement Agreement and this Order. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(ii).

3 7. CAFA Notice. The notice provided by the Class Administrator to the appropriate State and  
4 federal officials pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1715 fully satisfied the requirements of that statute.

5 8. Settlement Class Response. A total of 335,816 Settlement Class Members made valid claims,  
6 and a total of 2 Settlement Class Members submitted timely and proper Requests for Exclusion, as reported  
7 in the declaration of the Class Administrator submitted to this Court. The Court hereby orders that each of  
8 the individuals who submitted valid Requests for Exclusion are excluded from the Settlement Class. Those  
9 individuals will not be bound by the Settlement Agreement, and neither will they be entitled to any of its  
10 benefits.

11 9. Objections. No timely and proper Objections to the Settlement Agreement were submitted.  
12 Plaintiffs faced serious risks both on the merits of their claims and on the ability to maintain certification as  
13 a litigation class in this matter. The relief provided to the Settlement Classes pursuant to the Settlement  
14 Agreement is adequate, given the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal, and taking into consideration the  
15 attorney’s fees this Court has awarded. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(i), (iii). The Settlement also treats  
16 class members equitably relative to each other. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(D).

17 10. Final Settlement Approval. The Court hereby finally approves the Settlement Agreement, the  
18 exhibits, and the Settlement contemplated thereby (“Settlement”), and finds that the terms constitute, in all  
19 respects, a fair, reasonable, and adequate settlement as to all Settlement Class Members in accordance with  
20 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and directs its consummation pursuant to its terms and  
21 conditions.

22 11. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs; Service Awards. The Court approves Class Counsel’s application  
23 for \$5,967,606.00 in attorneys’ fees and costs, and for service awards to each Settlement Class representative  
24 in the amount \$7,500.00. The Settlement Agreement provides for Class Counsel’s Fee Award to be paid  
25 before the time to appeal this Order has expired. If the Fee Award is voided or reduced on appeal, either  
26 directly or as a result of the final approval of the Settlement as a whole being vacated, overturned, reversed,  
27 or rendered void as a result of an appeal, Class Counsel shall within thirty (30) days repay either to the  
28 Settlement Fund or to Post the affected amount of the attorneys’ fees and costs paid to Class Counsel, in an

1 amount proportionate to the distribution among Class Counsel's firms, in accordance with the directions in  
2 the Settlement Agreement. By receiving any payments pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, The Law  
3 Office of Jack Fitzgerald, PC and Jackson & Foster, LLC and their shareholders, members, and/or partners  
4 submit to the jurisdiction of this Court for the enforcement of the reimbursement obligation set forth herein  
5 and in the Settlement Agreement. If Class Counsel fails to timely repay the attorneys' fees and costs that are  
6 owed under this provision, the Court shall be entitled, upon application of Post, and notice to Class Counsel,  
7 to summarily issue orders, including but not limited to judgments and attachment orders against each of Class  
8 Counsel.

9       12.     Dismissal. The Court hereby DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE, without costs to any party,  
10 except as expressly provided for in the Settlement Agreement, the Action, as defined in the Settlement  
11 Agreement.

12       13.     Release. Upon the Effective Date as defined in the Settlement Agreement, the Plaintiffs and  
13 each and every one of the Settlement Class Members unconditionally, fully, and finally releases and forever  
14 discharges the Released Parties from the Released Claims. In addition, any rights of the Class Representatives  
15 and each and every one of the Settlement Class Members to the protection afforded under Section 1542 of  
16 the California Civil Code and any other similar, comparable, or equivalent laws, are terminated.

17       14.     Injunction Against Released Claims. Each and every Settlement Class Member, and any  
18 person actually or purportedly acting on behalf of any Settlement Class Member(s), is hereby permanently  
19 barred and enjoined from commencing, instituting, continuing, pursuing, maintaining, prosecuting, or  
20 enforcing any Released Claims (including, without limitation, in any individual, class or putative class,  
21 representative or other action or proceeding), directly or indirectly, in any judicial, administrative, arbitral,  
22 or other forum, against the Released Parties. This permanent bar and injunction is necessary to protect and  
23 effectuate the Settlement Agreement, this Final Order of Dismissal, and this Court's authority to effectuate  
24 the Settlement Agreement, and is ordered in aid of this Court's jurisdiction and to protect its judgments.

25       15.     No Admission of Liability. The Settlement Agreement and any and all negotiations,  
26 documents, and discussions associated with it will not be deemed or construed to be an admission or evidence  
27 of any violation of any statute, law, rule, regulation, or principle of common law or equity, or of any liability  
28 or wrongdoing by Defendant, or the truth of any of the claims. Evidence relating to the Agreement will not

1 be discoverable or admissible, directly or indirectly, in any way, whether in this Action or in any other action  
2 or proceeding, except for purposes of demonstrating, describing, implementing, or enforcing the terms and  
3 conditions of the Agreement, the Preliminary Approval Order, or this Order.

4 16. Findings for Purposes of Settlement Only. The findings and rulings in this Order are made for  
5 the purposes of settlement only and may not be cited or otherwise used to support the certification of any  
6 contested class or subclass in any other action.

7 17. Effect of Termination or Reversal. If for any reason the Settlement terminates or Final  
8 Approval is reversed or vacated, the Settlement and all proceedings in connection with the Settlement will  
9 be without prejudice to the right of Defendant or the Class Representatives to assert any right or position that  
10 could have been asserted if the Agreement had never been reached or proposed to the Court, except insofar  
11 as the Agreement expressly provides to the contrary. In such an event, the certification of the Settlement  
12 Classes will be deemed vacated. The certification of the Settlement Classes for settlement purposes will not  
13 be considered as a factor in connection with any subsequent class certification issues.

14 18. Settlement as Defense. In the event that any provision of the Settlement or this Final Order of  
15 Dismissal is asserted by Defendant as a defense in whole or in part to any claim, or otherwise asserted  
16 (including, without limitation, as a basis for a stay) in any other suit, action, or proceeding brought by a  
17 Settlement Class Member or any person actually or purportedly acting on behalf of any Settlement Class  
18 Member(s), that suit, action or other proceeding shall be immediately stayed and enjoined until this Court or  
19 the court or tribunal in which the claim is pending has determined any issues related to such defense or  
20 assertion. Solely for purposes of such suit, action, or other proceeding, to the fullest extent they may  
21 effectively do so under applicable law, the Parties irrevocably waive and agree not to assert, by way of  
22 motion, as a defense or otherwise, any claim or objection that they are not subject to the jurisdiction of the  
23 Court, or that the Court is, in any way, an improper venue or an inconvenient forum. These provisions are  
24 necessary to protect the Settlement Agreement, this Order and this Court's authority to effectuate the  
25 Settlement, and are ordered in aid of this Court's jurisdiction and to protect its judgment.

26 19. Injunctive Relief. By attaching the Settlement Agreement as an exhibit and incorporating its  
27 terms herein, the Court determines that this Final Order complies in all respects with Federal Rule of Civil  
28 Procedure 65(d)(1).

1           20.    Retention of Jurisdiction. Without affecting the finality of the Judgment, the Court reserves  
2 jurisdiction over the implementation, administration, and enforcement of the Judgment and the Agreement  
3 and all matters ancillary to the same.

4           21.    Post-Distribution Accounting. Within 21 days after the distribution of the settlement funds  
5 and payment of attorneys' fees, the parties should file a Post-Distribution Accounting in accordance with the  
6 Northern District of California's Procedural Guidance for Class Action Settlements.

7           22.    Entry of Judgment. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter Judgment.  
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9 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

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11 Dated: \_\_\_\_\_, 2021

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12 Hon. William H. Orrick  
13 United States District Judge  
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